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ABSTRACT
PCAOB inspectors are afforded privileged insight into the quality of audits selected for
inspection. Using inspection reports from 2005-2012, I create a unique sample of audits that
were inspected by the PCAOB (i.e., all of an auditor’s clients were selected for inspection). By
tracing inspection findings to specific engagements, I directly identify compliant and noncompliant audits. I examine the contributing factors of ‘audit quality’ and provide evidence that
higher audit fees and greater human capital are positively related to compliant PCAOB
inspections. When PCAOB findings can be linked to a specific engagement, I also find that, on
average, the client dismissal rate for deficient auditors is nearly twice as high as the dismissal
rate for non-deficient auditors. I further generalize these findings to a larger sample and find
some evidence that the smallest auditors are disproportionately impacted by inspection findings.
That is, results indicate that client reactions to the PCAOB inspection process are
disproportionately greater for the smallest audit firms that have a large proportion of their clients
selected for inspection. Finally, I find no evidence that inspection findings affect the fees charged
by the auditor and no evidence that the relation between client dismissals and inspection
deficiencies has diminished since the initial inspection period. Taken together, these findings
have implications for how stakeholders use inspection reports and how the PCAOB conducts and
reports on the inspection process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) marked a dramatic shift from a selfregulated to a government-regulated auditing profession. SOX begins by explicitly stating that its
purpose is “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures” (SOX 2002). To this end, the first section of SOX establishes the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the audits of public companies. The PCAOB
is charged with conducting inspections of public company auditors and has effectively replaced
the AICPA’s system of peer review (Lennox and Pittman 2010). Under the new regime, the
PCAOB publishes a written report containing a portion of its findings to the public. These
reports however are not intended to be a ‘balanced scorecard’ of overall audit quality since the
PCAOB uses non-random sampling techniques to identify audit failures. This approach has
drawn criticism for lacking informativeness to decision makers. In fact, several observers
criticized the lack of detail in inspection reports and called for disclosure of inspected audit
clients (Whitehouse 2013). In this study, I compile a unique sample of inspections for small audit
firms where clients are identifiable. I directly investigate the factors that contribute to compliant
audits by examining the determinants of PCAOB deficiencies using client and auditor specific
data. I then examine whether PCAOB deficient audits are followed by auditor dismissals for
clients that are identifiable in the inspection process.
I extend the existing literature in several ways. First, previous literature has been unable
to directly link PCAOB inspection findings (deficiencies) to specific clients. I overcome this
issue by using a sample of inspection findings for auditors where all clients are subject to
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inspection procedures. 1 As such, I directly evaluate the contributing factors and consequences of
poor audit quality. I find evidence that PCAOB inspection findings are associated with low
engagement-specific ‘audit inputs’ (i.e., low audit work measured by low audit fees and a low
ratio of partners to clients). These results inform the ongoing discussion on valid metrics that can
be used to infer quality audits (DeFond and Zhang 2013; PCAOB 2013b). Results also indicate
that non-compliant audits have economic consequences for auditors. Specifically, clients with
PCAOB inspection findings are significantly more likely to dismiss their auditor than clients
with no PCAOB findings (‘clean’ reports). 2 I generalize this result to larger auditors whose
clients are not directly identifiable. I also investigate whether inspection findings
disproportionately impact clients that were more likely to be selected for PCAOB inspection. I
find that PCAOB inspection findings are associated with increases in client dismissals as clients
become more identifiable. Lastly, using a longitudinal sample of inspections, I find evidence that
PCAOB inspection findings continue to be associated with auditor dismissals after multiple
‘rounds’ of inspections.
Small audit firms (those with less than 100 public clients) provide a unique setting to
investigate the effects of PCAOB inspection findings. These firms tend to serve clients with high
information risk suggesting a heightened need for high quality audits (Hogan and Martin 2009).
Furthermore, outside of PCAOB inspection and registration reports, stakeholders have few
sources of information related to the quality and reputation of small auditors (Goelzer 2008).
Recently, the PCAOB expressed concern with the severity of inspection findings for small
auditors (PCAOB 2013a). However, it remains unclear whether PCAOB inspection findings
1

Throughout the paper I refer to ‘identifiable’ clients. These are instances where inspection outcomes can be traced
to specific engagements.
2
I recognize that the PCAOB does not provide an opinion on each audit inspected. In some cases, however, I refer
to audits that were inspected but no findings were noted as ‘clean’ inspections for convenience.
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have consequences for these auditors. Empirical evidence is somewhat limited and largely mixed
regarding the relation between PCAOB inspection findings and auditor changes. Using a sample
of initial inspection findings, Lennox and Pittman (2010) indicate that less is known about audit
quality since the PCAOB inspections began. The authors document a decline in the content of
the AICPA peer review reports after the inception of the PCAOB inspection program and find no
evidence that clients rely on PCAOB inspection findings when selecting an auditor. Using a
similar sample period, Abbott et al. (2013) find that larger companies with better governance
characteristics are more likely to dismiss their auditor after the release of relatively infrequent
but severe deficiencies related to the auditor’s failure to identify or address a departure from
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Similar to Lennox and Pittman (2010),
however, they do not find that clients respond to the most commonly noted deficiencies which
relate to non-compliance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). These studies
investigate the effects of inspection findings on all clients in an auditor’s portfolio. That is,
inspection report findings are assumed to be indicative of audit quality provided to all clients.
However, the PCAOB explicitly cautions against projecting inspection findings to assess the
quality of the firm as a whole since the sample of clients selected by the PCAOB is not intended
to be representative of the audit firm’s overall audit work. These issues could contribute to the
lack of evidence of an association between inspection findings and client decision making.
Furthermore, the lack of statistical significance documented in prior literature does not
necessarily provide evidence of a lack of association between inspection findings and
stakeholder decisions (DeFond 2010).
While the PCAOB maintains confidentiality of the specific clients selected for inspection,
it is less able to do so for smaller auditors whose clients are more easily identifiable. To construct
3

a sample of inspected audit clients, I identify PCAOB inspection reports where all of an auditor’s
clients are selected for inspection. In this way, I am the first to directly trace PCAOB inspection
deficiencies to specific audits. I further investigate the effect of PCAOB inspection findings for
larger triennially inspected firms. Inspection report deficiencies for auditors with fewer clients
should be more consequential for both the auditor and the auditor’s clients as any deficiencies
are more easily traced to each individual audit. Following this logic, I investigate whether or not
the PCAOB inspection process is more consequential for smaller auditors and for an auditor’s
largest clients. Lack of client anonymity could disadvantage small auditors by encouraging
clients to contract a larger auditor where they would be less likely to be targeted for PCAOB
inspection and less identifiable if selected. In other words, the inspection reports could be
inadvertently creating a barrier to entry by granting larger firms a de facto advantage in the
inspection process, possibly inhibiting competition from small auditors. On the other hand,
consistent with the findings of DeFond and Lennox (2011), the inspection process could serve
the public interest by driving the smallest and most deficient auditors out of the market for public
company audits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
background information and develops hypotheses. In the third and fourth sections, I describe the
research design and the sample respectively. The fifth and sixth sections present the results and
sensitivity analyses. The final section concludes with a discussion of the study’s contribution,
implications, and potential limitations.
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II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Inspection Findings Directly Attributable to Specific Audit Clients
PCAOB inspections are intended to assess compliance with laws, rules, and professional
standards for audits of public issuers (PCAOB 2012a). Under SOX, the PCAOB is required to
inspect accounting firms with at least one public client (SOX 2002; Olson 2008). Large audit
firms with greater than 100 public clients are subject to annual inspections from the PCAOB.
Since 2005 only the eight largest auditors have been subject to annual inspections on a consistent
basis. 3 Smaller auditors with less than 100 public clients are subject to periodic triennial
inspections. Recently, PCAOB board member Jeannette Franzel expressed concern “about the
level and types of deficiencies in the triennial firm inspections” (Hoffelder 2013). In a 2013
report, the PCAOB identified the following root causes of these deficiencies: lack of technical
competence, lack of due professional care, ineffective oversight, and ineffective client
continuance and acceptance practices (PCAOB 2013a). It should come as no surprise that, from
the PCAOB’s perspective, audit deficiencies noted during the inspection process are of
significant consequence. 4 In fact, the PCAOB states that disclosed deficiencies indicate that “the
firm did not satisfy its fundamental responsibility to obtain reasonable assurance about whether
the financial statements are free of material misstatement” (PCAOB 2012a). In some cases, the
deficiency remediation process identifies errors of such significance that the client’s financial
statements were subsequently restated. These instances indicate that the PCAOB identifies issues

3

These firms include: BDO, Deloitte, Crowe, Ernst and Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG, McGladrey, and PwC.
Nearly all of the remaining auditors have been subject to triennial inspections with the exception of Malone Bailey
whose first annual inspection was released in 2010 (PCAOB 2012a).
4
Some observers have indicated that no issue is too small to warrant PCAOB attention and that deficiencies are
simply the result of differences in professional opinion or failure to document a procedure (Farrell and Shadab
2005). The PCAOB cautions users of these inspection reports to be skeptical of such claims as the PCAOB takes
such factors into consideration when deciding whether or not to disclose them in the inspection report (PCAOB
2012a).
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that, if uncorrected, could result in material errors in audited financial statements. 5 Further
supporting the validity of inspection findings, Gunny and Zhang (2013) find that inspection
deficiencies are positively related to restatements and abnormal accruals and negatively related
to the likelihood of issuing a going concern modification. As such, inspection findings should be
consequential to the client-auditor relationship.
Recent literature has begun to investigate the trends and effects of the PCAOB inspection
program. Hermanson et al. (2007) and Church and Shefchik (2012) document trends in
inspection findings. Using a sample of early inspection reports, Hermanson et al. (2007) finds
that approximately 60 percent of small auditor inspections contained deficiencies. Further, the
authors find that deficient auditors were generally smaller and growing faster than non-deficient
auditors. Church and Shefchik (2012) show that deficiencies seem to be declining from 20052009 for large annually inspected auditors. 6 Several studies have also found that PCAOB
inspections may have improved audit quality. Gramling et al. (2011) show that small audit firms
are more likely to issue a going concern audit report following the initial inspection. Carcello et
al. (2011) document a significant reduction in abnormal accruals in the years following the first
and second PCAOB inspections of Big 4 firms. Lamoreaux (2013) finds that exposure to the
PCAOB’s international inspection program is associated with increased reporting of material
weaknesses and going concern modifications. In an experimental setting, Robertson and Houston
(2010) find that non-sophisticated investors perceive financial reporting credibility to improve
following a PCAOB inspection.
5

During the inspection process, inspectors review audit documentation and discuss issues with members of the audit
team and firm leadership. The inspectors do not reperform audit procedures. However, if deficiencies are noted
during the inspection, the auditor is required by professional standards to remediate the issue in a timely fashion.
This remediation process can involve the performance of additional audit procedures. I discuss the remediation
process further in Section III.
6
However, the PCAOB continues to express concern with the rate of deficiencies at large annually inspected
auditors, particularly those relating to the audit of internal controls (PCAOB 2012b).
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Extant literature is somewhat inconclusive regarding the usefulness of inspection findings
to interested parties. In a survey of audit professionals and investors, Christensen et al. (2013)
highlight the differing perspectives on the value of inspection findings. In an archival setting,
Hilary and Lennox (2005) examine the peer review inspection regime as an information signal to
clients. They find that auditors lost clients following a modified or adverse peer review report
indicating that the peer review program provided useful information to clients. Lennox and
Pittman (2010) extend these findings by investigating the information value of different
inspection regimes surrounding the initiation of PCAOB inspections. Using changes in auditor
client portfolios surrounding inspection reports issued from 2005-2007, they find no association
between PCAOB findings and subsequent client choices. The authors contend that less is known
about audit firm quality under a PCAOB inspection regime than under the AICPA peer review
regime. In a similar study, however, Abbott et al. (2013) find some evidence that client
dismissals are associated with the public disclosure of inspection deficiencies. Specifically, they
find that this relation is driven by GAAP (severe and infrequent) deficiencies and find no
evidence that other inspection deficiencies (GAAS deficiencies) have an impact on auditor
retention decisions. These studies are based on the assumption that users of inspection reports
perceive inspection findings to be indicative of overall firm audit quality. However, the PCAOB
does not consider the inspection program to be a signaling mechanism of audit quality. Rather,
the PCAOB uses the inspection process as a tool to improve the auditor’s processes and to
identify and remediate any deficiencies in their audits. In this regard, the PCAOB has adopted an
approach of targeting those areas where deficiencies are most likely to occur rather than
obtaining a representative sample of a firm’s audit work. As such, since the PCAOB’s selection
process is not random, inspection findings do not represent the overall work performed by the
7

auditor. This is particularly the case for large auditors where inspection findings cannot be
attributed to specific clients. In a 2012 report titled “Information for Audit Committees about the
PCAOB Inspection Process” the PCAOB states (emphasis added):
…audit work is selected for inspection largely on the basis of an analysis of factors that,
in the PCAOB inspection staff's view, heighten the possibility that auditing deficiencies
are present, rather than through a process intended to identify a representative sample of
the audit firm's work. Accordingly, the Board cautions against extrapolating from the
results presented in the public portion of the report to broader conclusions about the
frequency of deficiencies throughout a firm's practice. The Board also cautions against
judging the relative quality of firms' audit practices solely on the basis of the number of
deficiencies described in the public portions of inspection reports. Nevertheless, the
public portion of a report can be a useful starting point for discussion between an audit
committee and the audit firm it oversees about the inspection (PCAOB 2012a).

The PCAOB clearly cautions users to avoid projecting audit deficiencies to the
uninspected population. 7 ‘Anonymity’ of clients inspected could explain the lack of association
between PCAOB findings and subsequent client choices documented in previous literature. That
is, PCAOB inspections are uninformative because the disclosure of findings is vague and nonrepresentative. However, while the PCAOB maintains anonymity of those clients that were
selected for inspection it is less able to do so for clients of smaller auditors. In some cases, when
the auditor has a very small number of clients, the PCAOB will inspect all of the auditor’s clients
(CAQ 2012). That is, the inspected clients are identifiable and findings can be traced to specific
engagements. These cases provide a unique setting to directly evaluate the potential effect of
PCAOB inspection findings on a client’s decision to retain its auditor (Abernathy et al. 2013). I
make the following hypothesis (stated in alternative form):

7

The PCAOB also states in each inspection report that “the express inclusion of certain deficiencies and potential
deficiencies, however, should not be construed to support any negative inference that any other aspect of the firm's
systems, policies, procedures, practices, or conduct is approved or condoned by the Board or judged by the Board to
comply with laws, rules, and professional standards.”
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H1: PCAOB inspection findings for auditors with identifiable inspected clients are
related to subsequent client dismissals.

Effect of Inspection Findings Based on the Visibility of an Auditor’s Clients
The effects of inspection findings may also extend to larger audit firms where the
proportion of clients subject to inspection is lower. However, I posit that inspection findings
have differential effects based on client and auditor characteristics. Following the discussion
above, I predict that inspection findings are more consequential for smaller auditors for several
reasons. First, small auditors generally have less reputational capital than larger auditors. To the
extent that inspection findings are a signal of audit quality, the effects may be less pronounced
for a larger auditor that has already built a reputation with a more substantial track record on
public company audits. For clients that contract small audit firms, the PCAOB registration and
inspection information may weigh more heavily in its decision making process when assessing
compliance with audit standards (Goelzer 2008). Second, following the theory of regulatory
capture, small auditors may be at a disadvantage relative to large auditors since large auditors
have greater resources and incentives to influence regulatory outcomes (Bozanic et al. 2012;
Stigler 1971). 8 This theory would predict that PCAOB regulation would tend to be more
favorable to larger audit firms. In fact, Daugherty and Tervo (2010) surveyed audit firm
leadership regarding the inspection process and found that smaller auditors reported negative
consequences of the PCAOB inspection program on their accounting firm while larger auditors
8

This is further evidenced by the considerable reporting lag for quality control criticisms released on three of the
Big 4 auditors. The PCAOB disclosed unremediated quality control criticisms approximately 3 years after the
release of the original inspection report instead of the 12 months specified by SOX. This lag was likely due to
differences in complexity as well as the large firms’ ability to delay the process via appeal to the SEC. I show
further evidence of this issue in descriptive analyses where reports for larger firms are associated with longer
reporting delays.
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reported more favorable impacts. 9 Lastly, anonymity of inspected clients is often cited as a
limitation when investigating the effects of inspection findings on specific clients. While the
PCAOB strives to maintain anonymity for those clients that were selected for inspection, it is
less able to do so for clients of small audit firms and completely unable to do so for clients of the
smallest audit firms. In other words, a single deficiency is less likely to be associated with a
client whose auditor has 50 clients than a client whose auditor has five clients. Using data from
all inspection reports released from 2005-2012, auditors with two to five public clients have, on
average, over 70 percent of their engagements selected for review whereas those auditors with
70-100 public clients have approximately 10 percent of their clients selected for review. As audit
firms get larger, the percentage of clients selected for inspection is monotonically declining. As
discussed above, clients of smaller auditors are less ‘shielded’ by anonymity afforded to clients
of larger audit firms. Additionally, inspection findings may be more representative of overall
firm audit quality as the proportion of clients selected for inspection increases. As such, it stands
to reason that inspection findings are more consequential for small audit firms. 10 This leads to
my next hypothesis (stated in alternative form):

H2: The relation between PCAOB inspection findings and client dismissals is stronger as
clients selected for inspection become more identifiable (less anonymity).

9

The smallest audit firms reported negative consequences related to “decreasing acceptance and retention of public
audit clients, increasing hours and billings on engagements, and decreasing their ability to attract and retain audit
personnel” (Daugherty and Tervo 2010).
10
Using a sample of largely first round inspections, Abbott et al. (2013) have a control variable that indicates the
relation between GAAP (significant) deficiencies and client switches is exacerbated for auditors with less than 5
clients in first round inspections. While this is not a focus of their study, I further explore this finding for all types of
deficiencies. This section of my study is different in that I investigate the effects of all PCAOB findings on clients
that were likely (or certain) to be targeted for inspection. This is the first study to my knowledge to estimate the
differential client reactions to deficiencies based on the likelihood of inspection.
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Since the PCAOB selects clients based on size and risk, it is also likely that findings
relate to the largest and most complex clients of each auditor. The PCAOB’s risk factors include:
nature and industry of the issuer, likelihood of audit deficiencies, market capitalization,
operations in emerging markets, and other firm, office, or partner specific considerations. 11 The
PCAOB generally selects those areas that represent the greatest risk of deficiency (PCAOB
2012a). This process is consistent with the PCAOB’s objective to improve overall quality
controls for inspected auditors. By identifying those areas that are most likely to prompt
inspection findings, the PCAOB can isolate where the system of quality controls was not
operating effectively (Whitehouse 2013). A consequence of this method is that targeted clients
may be more likely to switch if deficiencies are traceable to their audits. Similarly, relatively
large and sophisticated clients of small auditors may change auditors to avoid future inspection
findings. To illustrate, if Client A makes up a large fraction of an auditor’s portfolio, the chance
of Client A’s audit being selected for inspection is relatively high. However, if Client A switched
to a larger auditor where Client A made up a smaller portion of the auditor’s portfolio, then
Client A’s chances of being selected for inspection are lower. In other words, I expect the
relation between client dismissals and inspection findings to be greater for relatively large
clients. This leads to the next hypothesis (stated in alternative form):

H3: The relation between PCAOB inspection deficiencies and client dismissals is
stronger for clients that represent a larger proportion of the auditor’s client portfolio.

11

Based on discussions with partners at triennially inspected firms, the PCAOB is predicable in its selection process
by inspecting the largest clients. This is consistent with survey findings of Houston and Stefaniak (2013)
documenting that auditors believe they can effectively anticipate which clients will be inspected.

11

Effect of Inspection Findings after the Initial Round of Inspections
I extend prior literature by examining auditor changes following inspections using a
sample period from 2005-2012 with multiple inspection reports for each firm. A longer sample
period allows for more statistical power as well as an inter-temporal analysis of inspection
findings. It is an empirical question as to whether inspection findings have become more or less
informative over time. If inspections have increased adherence to professional standards then the
first round of inspections likely contained the most consequential and relevant information
related to deficient audits. That is, the most severe deficiencies in public company audits were
likely identified in the first round of inspections. Furthermore, DeFond and Lennox (2011) find
that small low quality auditors left the market following SOX. Any auditors that ‘survived’ the
initial phase of inspections may be of higher quality and have less severe deficiencies in future
inspections. Lastly, clients that were likely to respond to inspection findings may have already
changed auditors after the initial inspection period.
There are also several reasons that inspection report findings may have become more
informative over time. First, when the PCAOB began releasing inspection reports, clients did not
have a benchmark to compare inspection findings. In other words, it was difficult to differentiate
audit quality between two auditors without any historical basis for how inspection findings
reflect audit quality. Second, since the inspectors tend to select high risk audits and high risk
accounts, between-auditor variation in inspection findings may simply be the result of
differences in auditors’ portfolios. Hermanson et al. (2007) find evidence that the first PCAOB
inspections targeted small, risky, and rapidly growing audit firms. Lennox and Pittman (2010)
confirm this trend by showing that PCAOB inspectors targeted those audit firms with deficient
peer review findings in the initial round of inspections. It is possible then that clients were
12

already aware of the quality provided by these auditors and any inspection deficiencies were
expected. Subsequent inspections, however, allow stakeholders to observe inter-temporal
improvement or deterioration in audit deficiencies within each audit firm. Third, the PCAOB
may have become more competent in conducting inspections after the initial round of
inspections. The change from a self-regulated to a government-regulated regime is often
characterized as a tradeoff between expertise and objectivity (DeFond and Zhang 2013; DeFond
2010; Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971). Lack of peer reviewer objectivity was a primary reason that
SOX sought to establish the PCAOB as an independent, quasi-governmental regulator. 12 Despite
the PCAOB’s focus on objectivity, one of the early criticisms of the PCAOB was that the agency
was not prepared or did not have the technical expertise to regulate the auditing industry
(DeFond 2010). In an attempt to increase the independence of the regulatory body, SOX requires
the PCAOB to have a majority of board members who are not certified public accountants
(CPAs). Critics argue that this design creates a shortage of accounting and auditing expertise
required to regulate the industry (Palmrose 2005; Wallison 2005). It is therefore possible that the
initial inspections suffered from the PCAOB’s lack of preparedness or technical expertise as it
focused on developing inspection methodology and training inspectors. 13 However, to the extent
that this impaired the informativeness of inspection reporting, it is also possible that the PCAOB
has improved the inspection process over the past decade. This is evidenced by the evolution of
the PCAOB inspection process as the PCAOB has continued to revise its approach to
12

The PCAOB is a public institution in the sense that the SEC appoints the members of the board and approves
PCAOB actions. Further, the PCAOB is granted the ability to tax public audit clients to fund its operations. The
PCAOB is private in the sense that its charter states that it is not a public agency and its employees do not work for
any government agency (Coates 2007). This unique quasi-governmental structure is designed to give the PCAOB
independence from the auditing profession while maintaining the ability to attract high quality professionals.
13
While the PCAOB may have been able to hire talented inspectors with relevant attestation experience, it is
unlikely that many of these new employees initially had substantial experience as inspectors. Additionally, if the
PCAOB allocated its best inspectors to the largest and most complex accounting firms, it stands to reason that any
lack of competent inspectors would be exacerbated for small auditor inspections.
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inspections. In 2008 former PCAOB Chairman Mark Olson stated “in the course of inspecting an
audit firm (large or small), the PCAOB takes a risk-based approach, which over time has
evolved. In particular, the program has become more effective and efficient in identifying the
large clients to inspect, and we are now better able to scope our inspections based on the size and
complexity of the firm and the audits under review” (Olson 2008). To the extent that these
revisions assist in making the process more effective, clients and stakeholders may also find the
report content more informative. As such, it is an empirical question as to whether the PCAOB
inspection process has become more or less informative to clients. This leads to my next
hypotheses (stated in null form):

H4: The relation between PCAOB inspection deficiencies and auditor dismissals has not
changed since the initial round of inspections.

14

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
I expect that companies will be more likely to dismiss audit firms with PCAOB
inspection findings than firms with clean inspection reports. While the timing of PCAOB
inspections is exogenously determined, it is possible that the likelihood of PCAOB findings is
driven by auditor and client characteristics. As such, I use a multivariate logistic regression
framework to estimate the likelihood of client dismissal. To test H1, I use the following model
estimated on a sample of clients that were inspected by the PCAOB:

DISMISS =

β0 + β1*FINDING + β2*PARTNERS + β3*AUDITDELAY + β4*GCO +
β5*AUDITFEES + β6*GROWTH + β7*SIZE + β8*LEVERAGE +
β9*FIN-UTIL + ε

(1)

Dismissals are gathered from the Audit Analytics auditor changes dataset. DISMISS is an
indicator variable equal to one if the client announced a dismissal of the inspected auditor during
the two year period following the PCAOB’s inspection procedures. 14 While the PCAOB does not
typically contact client management during the inspection process, an inspection finding may
result in the client being aware of the inspection. In the inspection reports, the PCAOB states that
identified deficiencies constitute violations of professional standards such that it appears the
auditor “did not obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the
issuer's financial statements.” AU 390 further states that if the auditor determines that an omitted
procedure impairs the auditor’s ability to support a previously expressed opinion then the auditor

14

I include auditor resignations in the sample as non-dismissals. However, results are robust to their exclusion.
Furthermore, I test the sensitivity of the two-year cutoff to several alternative specifications and inferences are
unchanged. Refer to Section VI.
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should promptly apply the procedures or perform alternative procedures to support the previously
issued opinion. As such, these deficiencies may have been addressed before the inspection report
release date. In 2012, the PCAOB released a document titled “Information for Audit Committees
about the PCAOB Inspection Process” to inform interested parties about the PCAOB inspection
process and how to gather useful information about the inspections (PCAOB 2012a). The report
states that when the inspection team identifies potential deficiencies, they engage in dialogue
with members of the engagement team and firm leadership. The PCAOB states that “through that
dialogue, the staff also seeks to understand what steps, if any, the firm has undertaken or intends
to undertake to obtain audit evidence sufficient to determine whether it can support its previously
expressed audit opinion.” This can include the determination that the auditor involves the client
to perform the necessary work for previous and subsequent audits. Some inspection reports have
even noted that additional procedures prompted a client restatement. It follows that inspected
clients are likely to be aware of PCAOB findings if deficiencies can result in restatements of
previous filings. 15 Since the PCAOB reports to the SEC on its inspection process, the client may
be concerned about potential ramifications. As such, it stands to reason that some clients may
change auditors before the inspection findings become public. I perform several sensitivities to
the specification of the dismissal window in Section VI.
PCAOB findings (FINDING) are collected from PCAOB inspection reports and are
represented by an indicator variable equal to one if the PCAOB identified deficiencies in all of
the auditor’s clients. 16 Following H1, I predict that β1 will be positive and significant. I include
15

In fact, based on discussion with firm leadership at a large annually inspected firm, some firms have a policy of
notifying clients of a PCAOB inspection regardless of the inspection outcome. However, the client is more likely to
be aware and willing to react in the event of inspection related deficiencies.
16
Following previous literature, PCAOB findings can further be categorized into several different types. I use the
taxonomy (GAAS and GAAP) as determined by Abbott et al. (2013) in alternative analyses. The results are not
explained by relatively more severe GAAP deficiencies. See Section VI for discussion.
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several control variables that measure client and auditor characteristics. PARTNERS represents
the auditor’s ratio of partners to public clients. Client-auditor controls include: AUDITDELAY,
AUDITFEES, and GCO. AUDITDELAY represents the number of days between the client’s fiscal
year end and the date of the audit opinion. AUDITFEES is the natural log of the total audit fees
charged by the auditor. GCO is an indicator variable equal to one if the client received a going
concern audit report and zero otherwise. I also control for client characteristics that might relate
to audit deficiencies as well as the likelihood of an auditor change. GROWTH represents the
percentage change in assets from t-1 to t winsorized at a maximum value of 2. 17 SIZE is the
natural log of total assets. LEVERAGE represents debt to assets at time t. Lastly, I include an
indicator variable, FIN-UTIL, for financial and utility firms (for clients with SIC codes 49004949 and 6000-6999). 18
To test H2-H4, I expand the sample to all clients of inspected auditors. The models for
H2 and H3 are as follows:
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Alternatively I specify GROWTH using revenue consistent with Francis and Yu (2009) and results are unchanged.
To limit the potential effect of outliers, all other client specific variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile
using the entire population of observations with triennially inspected auditors. All inferences are unchanged if
variables are unwinsorized.
18
In untabulated analysis, I include industry fixed effects (using the Fama-French 12 factor taxonomy) in place of
FIN-UTIL in Model 1. Given the small sample sizes used to test H1, I have some industries without client
dismissals. These observations are excluded in this analysis since logit models have difficulty estimating coefficients
for independent variables that perfectly predict outcomes (client dismissals). All inferences are unchanged and a
Wald test does not indicate a significant difference between test variables.

17

DISMISS =

β0 + β1*MAJORFINDING + β2*MAJORFINDING x PERCENTINSPECTED +
β3*PERCENTINSPECTED + β4*RELATIVESIZE + β5*PARTNERS +
β6*CLIENTS + β7*AUDITDELAY + β8*GCO + β9*AUDITFEES +
β10*GROWTH + β11*SIZE + β12*LEVERAGE + Industry_FE + ε

DISMISS =

(2)

β0 + β1*MAJORFINDING + β2*MAJORFINDING x RELATIVESIZE +
β3*PERCENTINSPECTED + β4*RELATIVESIZE + β5*PARTNERS +
β6*CLIENTS + β7*AUDITDELAY + β8*GCO + β9*AUDITFEES +
β10*GROWTH + β11*SIZE + β12*LEVERAGE + Industry_FE + ε

(3)

Tests of H2 and H3 are similar in nature. I expect that PCAOB findings will result in
increased auditor dismissals when the findings are likely to be related to specific audit clients. In
this model I specify MAJORFINDING as an indicator variable equal to one if more than half of
an auditor’s inspected clients were deemed to have deficient audits. 19 PERCENTINSPECTED
represents the percentage of an auditor’s clients that were selected for inspection. As
PERCENTINSPECTED increases, the more likely a particular audit was selected for PCAOB
inspection. In model 2, I interact PERCENTINSPECTED with MAJORFINDING to determine
the differential impact of PCAOB findings as clients become more identifiable. The coefficient
on MAJORFINDING x PERCENTINSPECTED (β2) provides a test of H2. To test H3, I include
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Alternatively, I specify MAJORFINDING as a continuous variable representing the percentage in the auditor’s
inspected clients that were deemed to have deficient audits. Inferences are unchanged.

18

an interaction of MAJORFINDING and RELATIVESIZE. RELATIVESIZE represents the client’s
total assets scaled by the total assets of all clients audited by the firm. Since the PCAOB is
explicit that it selects the largest and most complex clients, relatively large clients are more likely
to have been targeted by inspectors. Since the audit firms in this sample vary in size and number
of clients, I add a control variable for the total number of audit clients (CLIENTS). 20 Lastly, I
include industry fixed effects.
To test H4, I estimate the following model on the sample of all clients of triennially
inspected auditors:

DISMISS =

β0 + β1* MAJORFINDING + β2*MAJORFINDING x NTHROUND +
β3*NTHROUND + β4*PERCENTINSPECTED + β5*RELATIVESIZE +
β6*PARTNERS + β7*CLIENTS + β8*AUDITDELAY + β9*GCO +
β10*AUDITFEES + β11*GROWTH + β12*SIZE + β13*LEVERAGE +
Industry_FE + ε

(4)

I include a variable indicating a second or third round inspection (NTHROUND). That is,
NTHROUND is equal to one for all inspections other than the first round. The interaction of
FINDING and NTHROUND provides a test of H4 and indicates whether the relation between
inspection findings and auditor dismissals has changed since the first round of inspections. 21 As
an additional test of H4, I explore whether inspection reports are more informative for those
auditors that improve or worsen by limiting the sample to only second and third round
20

I measure CLIENTS as the total number of all audit clients in Audit Analytics with an opinion signed within 18
months of the inspection procedures date. I do not require clients to be included in the final sample to be included in
this calculation. Alternatively, I specify the auditor size variable using total assets under audit. Inferences are
unchanged.
21
Linear combination of β1 + β2 indicates the total effect of deficient second and third round inspections.
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inspections. In this setting, I measure the change in inspection findings as the variable of interest
(ΔPERCENTFINDING).

20

IV. SAMPLE SELECTION
I hand collect available data from triennial inspection reports released from 2005-2012. 22
From these reports, I gather information related to auditor characteristics and the inspection
process. This data includes the beginning and ending dates of the inspection’s primary
procedures, the date the report was finalized, the number of issuer audits that were selected for
inspection, and the number of issuer audits that included PCAOB findings. While the inspection
reports detail the number of audits inspected as well as the number of audits with PCAOB
findings, they do not trace individual findings to specific issuers. To be included in the sample of
‘identifiable’ audit clients, the PCAOB must have selected all the auditor’s clients for inspection
and found that all of the audits contained findings or none of the audits contained findings. The
number of clients at each audit firm is determined similar to the CLIENTS variable described
above. That is, the number of clients subject to inspection is determined by the count of the most
recent audit opinions signed for each client within 18 months of the initial inspection procedures
in Audit Analytics. 23 By tracing inspection findings to specific audit clients, I can identify
instances where an experienced and trained inspector reviewed the work performed by the
auditor and found (or did not find) issues. While many studies rely on financial statement or
audit reporting outcomes to infer audit quality, this sample allows unique insight into the quality
of audits.
22

In October 2013 Audit Analytics released the Accounting and Oversight module in beta version. This module
includes a dataset with PCAOB inspection findings. Since the dataset is not in final version, I do not rely on this
dataset in this paper. However, I have reconciled my data against the data collected by Audit Analytics and verified
any differences.
23
I alter this definition to include the most recent audit opinion signed within 12 or 24 months and results are similar
although significance is slightly diminished for H1 using 24 months. To test the completeness of the Audit Analytics
dataset, I select, at random, 20 inspection reports from the sample and search the auditor’s name in the WRDS SEC
Analytics Suite. I did not identify any clients for these auditors that are missing in Audit Analytics. Alternatively,
auditors self-report the number of issuer clients in each inspection report. According to the PCAOB inspection
reports, this balance “does not reflect any determination concerning which, or how many, of the Firm's audit clients
are "issuers" as defined in the Act.” As such, the self-reported issuer clients may be unreliable. Nonetheless, results
are quantitatively and qualitatively similar if I measure CLIENTS using the self-reported balance.
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(Insert Table 1 Here)
Merging the inspection report data with Audit Analytics, I am able to trace the content of
inspection reports to the clients that were subject to inspection by identifying the most recently
signed audit opinion for each client leading up to the date of the inspection procedures. In this
way, I identify a population of audits that were sampled by the PCAOB at the time of inspection.
Table 1 describes the sample selection. Client specific variables are gathered from Audit
Analytics and Compustat. To be included in the sample, I require observations to have the
requisite data for the control variables listed above. I eliminate clients that discontinue SEC
filings after the PCAOB inspection by requiring all client observations to be included in Audit
Analytics for one year after the PCAOB inspection. I also exclude observations for PCAOB
sanctioned auditors and observations with unclear inspection information. I identify 4,454 audits
of triennially inspected auditors with requisite client data that could have been selected for
inspection by the PCAOB. This sample is used to test H2-H4.
I further reduce the sample by excluding clients of firms with partially deficient PCAOB
inspection findings. That is, I exclude those observations where inspection reports reveal
findings for only a portion of the inspected audits. To test H1, I compose two samples of
identifiable issuer audits. First, I limit the sample to inspections that selected all of the auditor’s
clients and found all audits to be either deficient or clean. This sample includes 350 audits that
were inspected by the PCAOB. I further limit the sample to those auditors that only have one
audit client. This sample includes 143 issuer audits. Since inspection findings can be traced to
these subgroups of clients, I use these samples to test H1.
(Insert Table 2 Here)
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Table 2 presents the industry distribution of the sample. I classify clients into industries
using the Fama-French 12 industry taxonomy. Small audit firms tend to have clients in the
financial industry. As such, financial firms make up a disproportionate amount of the sample. In
all analyses, I include either industry fixed effects or an indicator for financial services and
utilities (FIN-UTIL) to control for any differential impact these firms may have on tests of
hypotheses. 24

24

Alternatively, inferences are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if I drop financial and utility observations
from the sample.
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V. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics for Identifiable Inspected Audit Clients
Table 3 presents descriptive analyses for the sample of all identifiable audits and for the
sample of auditors with only one client in Panels A and B respectively. Inferences are consistent
in each sample. In support of H1, clients are substantially more likely to dismiss their auditor if
the audit has inspection findings than if the audit has no inspection findings. However, I find no
evidence of a relation between PCAOB findings and auditor resignations. 25 Univariate findings
also indicate that firm resources and audit inputs are positively related to clean inspection
findings. Specifically, the ratio of partners to clients (PARTNERS) is positively and significantly
related to clean inspection findings. Additionally, audit fees (AUDITFEES) are also positively
related to clean inspection findings. This indicates that effort and resources are positively
associated with PCAOB compliance. Another interesting inference is that the PCAOB takes
approximately six months longer to report deficient inspection findings than clean inspection
findings (INSPECTIONTOREPORT). This is likely a result of the remediation and
communication process between the inspectors and the auditors. Furthermore, audit firms are
more likely to ‘push back’ on the PCAOB if the report contains deficiencies. While these are
valid reasons for the longer delay in disclosing inspection deficiencies, the inspection reports
may become less consequential as the information content becomes ‘stale’. 26
(Insert Table 3 Here)
As noted above, the partner to client ratio (PARTNERS) and audit fees (AUDITFEES) are
positively associated with inspection compliance. I further explore these findings in Table 4
25

I explore auditor resignations in a multivariate setting in sensitivity analyses. Refer to Section VI.
Timeliness of inspection findings may be a factor in previous studies finding no evidence of client reaction to
PCAOB deficiencies. However, as discussed above, inspected clients of deficient audits are likely to be aware of
PCAOB issues during remediation or subsequent audits before inspection reports are released.
26
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using a deficiency prediction model. While I have no formal hypotheses related to these tests, the
results confirm some of the interesting inferences described above. First, in both columns 1 and
2, a greater partner to client ratio (PARTNERS) is associated with a lower likelihood of
deficiency. 27 Extant theoretical research suggests that auditor size is a driver of audit quality
since larger firms are associated with greater independence and have more reputational capital at
risk in the event of an audit failure (DeAngelo 1981). Additionally, larger auditors may provide
better audit quality due to ‘in house’ expertise and support networks (Francis and Yu 2009).
While the number of partners per client is likely a noisy measure of the resources devoted to a
single engagement, it is a proxy for institutional knowledge and reputational capital. These
findings provide direct evidence that audit firm size is a driver of audit quality even at the
smallest audit firms. Additionally, the coefficient on AUDITFEES is significant and negative,
indicating that higher audit fees are associated with better audit quality. This is likely an
indication that the auditor is performing more audit work resulting in greater compliance with
PCAOB standards.
(Insert Table 4 Here)

Multivariate Results for Identifiable Inspected Audit Clients
I present multivariate tests of H1 in Table 5. Consistent with H1, clients are more likely
to dismiss their current auditor if the audit is associated with deficiencies. I also find that this
result is economically significant. The average marginal effect of FINDING for columns 1 and 2
is 6 percent and 11 percent respectively. This indicates that the likelihood of dismissal increases
by 6-11 percent for auditors receiving deficiencies. Table 3 indicates that the rate of dismissal for
27

It is important to note that PARTNERS does not necessarily capture the number of audit partners at the firm.
Nonetheless, it is a proxy for the size and resources of the accounting firm relative to the number of public clients.
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auditors receiving clean inspections is 9-10 percent, so the conditional likelihood of dismissal
substantially increases when inspectors identify issues. These results indicate that, for clients
subject to inspection, poor audit quality is followed by an increased rate of client dismissal. 28
(Insert Table 5 Here)

Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Domestic Audits of Triennially Inspected Auditors
To test H2-H4, I expand the sample to all clients of triennially inspected auditors.
Auditors in this sample exhibit variation in the percentage of audits inspected with deficiencies.
Previous studies have classified inspection reports as deficient if an inspection includes at least
one deficiency and non-deficient otherwise. For purposes of my tests, I classify firms based on
the percentage of audits found to be deficient. If the majority of the audits inspected by the
PCAOB for a given auditor are found to be deficient, I classify these in the majority findings
group. For larger auditors, I find this specification to be more appealing since larger auditors
have more clients subject to inspection. The more audits inspected invariably increases the
likelihood of at least one PCAOB finding. This is further evidenced by annual inspections of
large auditors (Big 4 and “Second Tier” firms) which always include deficiencies. It is unlikely
though that annually inspected audit firms provide inferior audit quality to triennially inspected
firms. I instead classify clients whose auditors have findings for a majority (or a minority) of the
inspected audits. Table 6 presents descriptive characteristics of audits that were completed before
a PCAOB inspection occurred. Inferences for client dismissals are consistent with Table 3. That
28

The ‘one client’ sample used in estimation of column 2 of Table 5 is a subsample of the larger sample used in
column 1. In other words, the 350 observations in column 1 include all of the 143 observations from column 2. In
untabulated analysis, I estimate model 1 on a limited sample of clients that are unique to the larger sample from
column 1 (207 observations). The coefficient on FINDING is positive but insignificant. It is possible that the
reaction to deficiencies is negatively related to firm size for the reasons listed above. I further investigate this
relation in tests of H2.
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is, clients are more likely to dismiss auditors with PCAOB findings. Additionally, audit fees,
firm size, and a greater partner to client ratio are also associated with PCAOB compliance. 29
Consistent

with

the

significant

reporting

delay

documented

in

Table

3,

INSPECTIONTOREPORT is approximately one year for observations where the majority of
inspected audits were deemed to be clean and nearly a year and a half on average where the
majority of inspected audits were deemed to be deficient. 30
(Insert Table 6 Here)

Multivariate Results for All Audits of Triennially Inspected Auditors
Table 7 presents results for H2 and H3. MAJORFINDING represents an indicator
variable equal to one if the majority of the auditor’s inspected clients were associated with
findings. Column 1 indicates that PCAOB inspection findings are positively related to client
dismissals in the full sample of triennially inspected audit clients. In column 2, I include control
variables for the percentage of audit clients that were inspected by the PCAOB
(PERCENTINSPECTED) and a variable representing the client’s relative size (i.e., assets scaled
by the auditor’s total assets under audit) (RELATIVESIZE). The positive and significant
coefficient on RELATIVESIZE indicates that large clients are more likely to dismiss their
auditors than small clients following an inspection. This indicates that clients are more likely to
dismiss their auditors if they were likely to be targeted by inspection. The interactions in
columns 3 and 4 present direct tests of H2 and H3 respectively. The positive and significant
29

The going concern rate (GCO) for firms with findings for the majority of inspected clients is nearly 50%. This is
consistent with a similar sample using PCAOB inspections in Abbott et al. (2013).
30
The max INSPECTIONTOREPORT in this sample is 1,182 days for Weiser LLP. The report was dated December
18, 2007 and inspection procedures began on September 7, 2004 (PCAOB Release 104-2007-170). In untabulated
analyses, I drop all observations with reporting delays greater than 2 years. Results and inferences are unchanged.
Additionally, I include INSPECTIONTOREPORT as a control variable in all tests and results are unchanged.
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coefficient on MAJORFINDING x PERCENTINSPECTED indicates that clients are more likely
to react to inspection findings as they become more identifiable. The combination of
MAJORFINDING + MAJORFINDING x PERCENTINSPECTED indicates that identifiable
clients during the inspection process are more likely to dismiss their auditor if deficiencies are
noted (consistent with the findings in Table 5 for H1). The positive and insignificant coefficient
on MAJORFINDING x RELATIVESIZE does not indicate that the relatively large clients are
more likely to respond to inspection findings by dismissing the auditor than relatively small
clients. However, the combination of MAJORFINDING + MAJORFINDING x RELATIVESIZE
indicates that larger clients are more likely to dismiss their auditor if deficiencies are noted.
Taken together, I find direct support for H2 but not H3. 31 This table provides evidence that
PCAOB inspections are more consequential for smaller audit firms where the percentage of
audits inspected is likely to be higher and therefore the clients are more easily identifiable.
(Insert Table 7 Here)

Multivariate Results for Second and Third Round Inspection Reports
Table 8 presents tests of H4. In column 1, I include an indicator for second or third round
inspections (NTHROUND). The coefficient on NTHROUND is insignificant indicating no
detectable relation between second or third round inspections and client dismissals. The
interaction between MAJORFINDING and NTHROUND in column 2 represents the differential
impact of PCAOB findings on client dismissals for subsequent inspections and provides a test for
H4. The coefficient on MAJORFINDING x NTHROUND does not indicate that client reactions

31

To ensure that these findings are not explained by the smallest firms that have all clients selected for inspection. I
reperform tests in Table 7 excluding these observations and inferences are quantitatively and qualitatively
unchanged.
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to PCAOB inspection findings have changed over time. Interestingly, the linear combination of
MAJORFINDING and MAJORFINDING x NTHROUND indicates that PCAOB inspection
findings are still related to client dismissals after the first round of inspections. That is,
inspection findings exhibit a relation with client dismissals over time. Lastly, I investigate
whether changes in inspection findings relate to auditor dismissals. I limit the sample to second
and third round inspection reports

and

calculate a change in findings variable

(ΔPERCENTFINDING). I do not find that changes in inspection findings between first and
second round inspections influence client dismissal decisions.
(Insert Table 8 Here)
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VI. ADDITIONAL TESTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
Analysis of Client Dismissals and Engaged Auditors
Using the client initiated dismissals in each sample, I evaluate the characteristics of
newly engaged auditors. Based on the discussion above, I predict that clients will select larger
auditors where the likelihood of future inspection is lower. Table 9 presents descriptive analysis
of client dismissals and newly engaged auditors for each sample used in the study. The columns
present auditor dismissals in each sample in aggregate and by inspection outcome (i.e., majority
or minority findings). Each row classifies auditor dismissals by the characteristics of the newly
engaged auditor. Dismissals are classified as engaging a large annually inspected auditor (Big 4
or Second Tier) or as engaging another non-annually inspected audit firm. I further classify a
dismissal as engaging a larger triennially inspected auditor with more assets under audit than the
dismissed auditor (excluding the switching client’s assets). Not surprisingly, most clients
switching auditors following inspection tend to select larger auditors. Approximately 60 percent
of client dismissals in the full sample and 90 percent of all dismissals in the identifiable samples
result in contracting an auditor of larger size. Even though there are many options among very
small local auditors, clients leaving small auditors may be somewhat restricted to selecting larger
auditors. Nonetheless, this finding remains interesting because switching clients tend to select
auditors where the likelihood of future inspection is lower.
(Insert Table 9 Here)

Changes in Audit Fees and Auditor Resignations Following Inspection Findings
In untabulated analyses, I estimate the relation between inspection findings and changes
in audit fees. I have no directional prediction for the effect of inspection findings on changes in
30

audit fees. On one hand, if inspection findings indicate inferior audit quality, the client may wish
to negotiate a discount with the auditor. On the other hand, inspection findings are likely to
require more audit work in future engagements. As such, additional compliance costs to the
auditor may be shared with the client. To test this relation, I specify changes in audit fees for one
and two year periods surrounding the inspection procedures excluding clients that changed
auditors. I find no detectable relation between inspection findings and changes in audit fees.
While a lack of evidence of a relation is not evidence of a lack of a relation (DeFond 2010), it
seems that clients prefer dismissing auditors with deficiencies rather than renegotiating fees.
It is possible that auditors may resign from clients following difficulties with PCAOB
inspections. I reperform the tests above using auditor initiated resignations instead of client
initiated dismissals as the dependent variable. Similar to the specification above, I generate an
indicator variable, RESIGN, equal to one if the client announced an auditor resignation by the
inspected auditor during the two year window following the beginning of inspection procedures.
I do not find strong evidence for previous tests using auditor resignations instead of client
dismissals in a multivariate setting. This analysis is important since it indicates that auditor
changes following PCAOB inspection findings seem to be driven by demand-side rather than
supply-side forces.

Alternative Specifications of the Dismissal Window
In analyses of H1-H4 I specify DISMISS as a client dismissal of the inspected auditor
within 24 months of the inspection procedures. This window should capture the period when the
auditor becomes aware of any findings and remediates issues if necessary. It also captures the
period where the inspection findings are disclosed to the public. In untabulated analyses, I test
31

the robustness of this specification to several alternative specifications. First, I respecify the
dismissal window from 24 months following inspection procedures to 12 months following
inspection procedures and find similar results. Next, I specify the dismissal window to include
the period from the beginning of the inspection procedures to 12 months after the inspection
findings are released to ensure that the reporting delay does not affect the period of time that the
inspection findings are public. Since this window is, on average, longer for auditors with
inspection findings, I include a control variable for the reporting delay in all tests (i.e., the time
lapse between the inspection procedures until the report is released to the public INSPECTIONTOREPORT). 32 Results using this specification are also quantitatively and
qualitatively similar. In fact, I find strong support for H3. Lastly, I also specify DISMISS as a one
year period following the release of the inspection report similar to Abbott et al. (2013). I find
directionally consistent results with those presented above, but significance is diminished below
levels of conventional significance in most tests. It seems that many clients that were likely
targeted for inspection may react to inspection findings as the auditor addresses the issues
identified by the inspectors instead of waiting for the inspection report to be released.
Lastly, it is possible that PCAOB inspection findings are correlated with other auditor
characteristics that increase the likelihood of dismissal. In other words, some auditors may have
been more likely to be dismissed for reasons outside of (but correlated with) inspection
outcomes. To alleviate this concern, I specify the dismissal period as beginning on the most
recent audit report date and ending on the date of the inspection procedures. This ‘preinspection’ window covers the period before the inspection procedures begin, thus any client
32

Since the time lapse between inspection procedures and report release is a product of the inspection findings
(variable of interest), I do not include INSPECTIONTOREPORT in the primary tests. Since
INSPECTIONTOREPORT is not ‘predetermined’ relative to the variable of interest (FINDING) it is a ‘bad control’
as described by (Angrist and Pischke 2008).
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dismissals should not be related to the inspection process or outcomes. I generally find no
difference in dismissal rates for auditors with findings compared to those without findings using
the pre-inspection window alleviating some concern that unobservable client or auditor factors
explain the results. In fact, the coefficients on FINDING (MAJORFINDING) are negative and
marginally significant in some tests suggesting that deficient audits were less likely to be
associated with dismissals before the inspection procedures began. Taken together, clients that
dismiss their auditors seem to do so in the period following the PCAOB inspection procedures.

Inspection Finding Severity and Auditor Dismissals
Using a sample of first round inspections, Abbott et al. (2013) do not find evidence that
clients react to GAAS related PCAOB findings by dismissing their auditor. However, they do
find a client reaction to relatively infrequent but possibly more severe findings related to the
auditor’s failure to appropriately identify or address a departure from GAAP. To ensure that the
results above are not explained by only GAAP deficiencies I perform several additional tests.
First, I specify model 1 to include a separate control variable for GAAP related deficiencies.
Alternatively, I drop observations that included GAAP findings. Results for H1 are unchanged.
For H2-H4, I specify models 2-4 to include a control variable for the percentage of audits that
included a GAAP related deficiency. Results for H2-H4 are unchanged by the inclusion of a
separate GAAP findings control variable. 33

33

I caution the reader against drawing any strong conclusions from these findings. GAAP findings are infrequent in
my sample (occurring in less than 20% of inspections) while GAAS findings are relatively common (occurring in
over 50% of inspections). Furthermore, Abbott et al. (2013) use a different model specification, earlier time period,
and different sample for GAAP deficiencies.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The effect of the PCAOB inspection process on audit firms is an understudied topic in the
accounting literature. This study documents contributing factors of PCAOB compliance and
investigates client reactions to inspection findings based on the likelihood of inspection. Most of
the existing literature infers audit quality using financial reporting outcomes. I measure audit
quality by tracing PCAOB inspection findings to specific engagements. In this way, I identify a
sample of engagements where I can assess the auditor’s compliance with professional standards.
Results indicate that audit inputs and firm resources are positively related to PCAOB
compliance. I also find that PCAOB inspection findings have negative consequences for auditors
whose clients are identifiable. Clients that are more likely to be inspected are also more
responsive to inspection findings. I find no evidence that the reaction to PCAOB inspection
findings has declined over time. Taken together, this study indicates the potential consequences
of the PCAOB inspection program for auditors of inspected clients. Furthermore, the PCAOB
inspection process seems to be disproportionately burdensome for the smallest audit firms which
may have consequences for audit market competitiveness. These findings are also relevant to
ongoing policy debates over PCAOB’s inspection process. The PCAOB and SEC may want to
consider increasing the level of detail in inspection reports. As Lynn Turner stated, “the report
loses most of its value if you don't give us a company name” (Whitehouse 2013). Even though
the current process as prescribed by SOX does not permit much flexibility regarding the
inspection reporting process, the SEC and PCAOB may want to revisit how inspections are
conducted and how findings are disclosed.
This research is subject to several limitations. As in most archival studies, any inferences
are limited by the ability of the measures to capture the intended constructs as well as each
34

model’s ability to establish causal inferences. In addition, since the focus of this paper is on
small triennially inspected audit firms, some inferences might not be generalizable to large and
international audit firms. However, the effect of PCAOB inspection reports on clients of large
firms is an important area for future research.
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APPENDIX A: Tables
TABLE 1: Sample Selection
Observations
with requisite
client data
Domestic audits subject to inspection from Audit Analytics for reports released from
2005-2012 (triennially inspected auditors only)

5,203

Less:
Observations without necessary data at t+1
Observations with PCAOB sanctions dated before or during the dismissal window
Observations with unclear inspection information

(682)
(63)
(4)

Total domestic audits of triennially inspected auditors

4,454

Less:
Observations related to partially deficient PCAOB inspections (less than all
inspected clients had findings)
Observations where less than all of the auditor’s clients were selected for inspection
Total inspected client observations for auditors with 100% deficient or 100% clean
inspected audits (identifiable client sample)
Less:
Observations where the auditor has more than one client
Total domestic audits linked directly to inspection findings (one client sample)

(2,342)
(1,762)

350

(207)
143
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TABLE 2: Distribution of Sample Observations by Industry

Consumer Non-Durables
Consumer Durables
Manufacturing
Energy
Chemicals
Business Equipment
Telecommunications
Utilities
Wholesale and Retail
Healthcare
Financial Services and Banking
Other
Total

Fama-French
12 Industry
Classifier
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Total Sample of
Audits Subject to
PCAOB Inspection
164
61
268
298
136
719
124
37
238
501
1,220
688

Identifiable Client
Sample
14
2
29
26
11
44
9
4
17
28
122
44

One Client
Sample
7
2
7
13
8
18
2
0
6
8
55
17

4,454

350

143
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TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics – Identifiable Inspected Audit Clients
Panel A: Sample of Audits Subject to Inspection (All Inspected Sample)
VARIABLES
DISMISS
RESIGN
PARTNERS
AUDITDELAY
GCO
INSPECTIONTOREPORT
AUDITFEES
GROWTH
SIZE
LEVERAGE
FIN-UTIL

Total
n =350
0.117
0.049
5.239
74.149
0.226
214.763
11.232
0.220
16.911
0.670
0.360

No Findings
n = 271
0.103
0.048
5.663
74.959
0.192
168.513
11.337
0.238
17.056
0.637
0.351

Findings
n =79
0.165
0.051
3.788
71.367
0.342
373.418
10.873
0.156
16.414
0.784
0.392

Prediction
?
+
+
?
+
?
?
?
?

Difference
in Means
-0.061
-0.003
1.875
3.592
-0.150
-204.905
0.465
0.082
0.642
-0.148
-0.042

Test of
Difference
*
***
**
***
***
*
***

Panel B: Sample of Audits Subject to Inspection Where the Auditor Has Only One Client (One Client Sample)
VARIABLES
DISMISS
RESIGN
PARTNERS
AUDITDELAY
GCO
INSPECTIONTOREPORT
AUDITFEES
GROWTH
SIZE
LEVERAGE
FIN-UTIL

Total
n = 143
0.126
0.070
5.993
73.483
0.196
227.622
11.125
0.183
16.922
0.661
0.385

No Findings
n = 94
0.085
0.074
6.649
74.351
0.138
172.915
11.269
0.243
17.168
0.596
0.362

Findings
n =49
0.204
0.061
4.735
71.816
0.306
332.571
10.849
0.068
16.448
0.786
0.429

Prediction
?
+
+
?
+
?
?
?
?

Difference
in Means
-0.119
0.013
1.914
2.535
-0.168
-159.657
0.421
0.175
0.720
-0.190
-0.067

Test of
Difference
**
**
**
***
***
*
***

***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Significance is based on one (two) tailed p-values when
a prediction is (not) made. Significance is determined without the assumption of equal variances.
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TABLE 4: Multivariate Determinants of Findings for Identifiable Clients

VARIABLES
PARTNERS

-

AUDITDELAY

-

GCO

+

AUDITFEES

-

GROWTH

?

SIZE

?

LEVERAGE

?

FIN-UTIL

?

Intercept

?

(1)
All Inspected Sample
FINDING

(2)
One Client Sample
FINDING

-0.055**
(-1.901)
-0.002
(-0.333)
0.360
(0.775)
-0.747***
(-3.126)
-0.258
(-0.942)
0.086
(0.809)
1.277**
(2.383)
0.056
(0.131)
5.033**
(2.496)

-0.096***
(-2.491)
-0.004
(-0.519)
0.537
(0.758)
-0.616*
(-1.553)
-1.120**
(-2.162)
-0.076
(-0.499)
2.064**
(2.527)
0.565
(0.981)
6.608**
(2.102)

Observations
350
143
Pseudo R2
0.101
0.182
Area Under ROC Curve
0.722
0.778
Models are estimated using logistic regression with standard errors that are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered by audit firm (Petersen 2009). ***, **, and * represent
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Significance is based on one (two)
tailed p-values when a prediction is (not) made.
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TABLE 5: Multivariate Analyses of Auditor Dismissals for Identifiable Clients

VARIABLES
FINDING

+

PARTNERS

?

AUDITDELAY

?

GCO

+

AUDITFEES

?

GROWTH

+

SIZE

?

LEVERAGE

?

FIN-UTIL

?

Intercept

?

(1)
All Inspected
Sample
DISMISS

(2)
One Client Sample
DISMISS

0.604*
(1.552)
0.028**
(1.996)
0.002
(0.497)
-0.303
(-0.568)
0.227
(0.947)
-0.179
(-0.741)
-0.119
(-0.921)
0.471
(0.875)
-0.431
(-0.807)
-3.100
(-1.414)

1.090**
(2.182)
0.050
(1.071)
-0.000
(-0.001)
-1.099
(-1.282)
0.367
(0.851)
0.551
(1.259)
-0.372**
(-2.088)
1.116
(1.258)
0.258
(0.344)
-1.365
(-0.352)

Observations
350
143
Pseudo R2
0.031
0.103
Area Under ROC Curve
0.648
0.730
Models are estimated using logistic regression with standard errors that are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered by audit firm (Petersen 2009). ***, **, and * represent
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Significance is based on one (two)
tailed p-values when a prediction is (not) made.

46

TABLE 6: Descriptive Statistics – All Domestic Audit Clients of Inspected Auditors
Descriptive Statistics for Clients of All Triennially Inspected Auditors
VARIABLES
DISMISS
RESIGN
PERCENTINSPECTED
RELATIVESIZE
PARTNERS
CLIENTS
AUDITDELAY
GCO
INSPECTIONTOREPORT
AUDITFEES
GROWTH
SIZE
LEVERAGE
FIN-UTIL

Total
N = 4,454
0.118
0.037
0.322
0.166
2.079
30.258
79.720
0.309
390.549
11.322
0.239
16.408
0.684
0.282

Majority nonFindings
N = 3,266
0.101
0.030
0.316
0.149
2.316
32.097
78.788
0.244
344.822
11.532
0.225
16.929
0.670
0.318

Majority
Findings
N =1,188
0.163
0.058
0.339
0.214
1.426
25.204
82.283
0.490
516.258
10.749
0.277
14.977
0.724
0.184

Prediction
?
?
?
+
+
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

Difference
in Means
-0.062
-0.028
-0.023
-0.065
0.890
6.893
-3.495
-0.246
-171.436
0.783
-0.053
1.953
-0.055
0.135

Test of
Difference
***
***
**
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
***

***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Significance is based on one (two) tailed p-values when
a prediction is (not) made. Significance is determined without the assumption of equal variances.
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TABLE 7: Multivariate Analyses of Auditor Dismissals for Clients of Inspected Auditors
VARIABLES
MAJORFINDING

+

MAJORFINDING x PERCENTINSPECTED

+

MAJORFINDING x RELATIVESIZE

+

PERCENTINSPECTED

+

RELATIVESIZE

+

PARTNERS

?

CLIENTS

?

AUDITDELAY

?

GCO

+

AUDITFEES

?

GROWTH

+

SIZE

?

LEVERAGE

?

Intercept

?

Fixed Effects
Observations
Pseudo R2
Area Under ROC Curve

(1)
DISMISS

(2)
DISMISS

(3)
DISMISS

(4)
DISMISS

0.397***
(3.688)

0.374***
(3.439)

0.183
(1.152)
0.578*
(1.664)

0.313**
(2.494)

0.000
(0.022)
0.005***
(2.725)
0.002*
(1.891)
-0.196
(-1.391)
0.086
(1.281)
0.187***
(3.032)
-0.142***
(-5.580)
-0.148
(-0.907)
-1.309**
(-1.967)

0.264
(1.004)
0.451**
(2.118)
-0.008
(-0.417)
0.009***
(3.731)
0.002**
(1.997)
-0.180
(-1.268)
0.099
(1.474)
0.185***
(2.985)
-0.151***
(-5.815)
-0.154
(-0.937)
-1.594**
(-2.303)

0.0244
(0.0786)
0.440**
(2.047)
-0.005
(-0.297)
0.008***
(3.633)
0.002**
(2.000)
-0.176
(-1.236)
0.093
(1.370)
0.189***
(3.047)
-0.151***
(-5.819)
-0.170
(-1.031)
-1.429**
(-2.034)

0.325
(1.025)
0.263
(1.000)
0.303
(1.176)
-0.006
(-0.349)
0.008***
(3.681)
0.002**
(1.981)
-0.179
(-1.260)
0.097
(1.432)
0.186***
(2.999)
-0.152***
(-5.842)
-0.165
(-1.001)
-1.521**
(-2.194)

Industry

Industry

Industry

Industry

4,454
0.041
0.652

4,454
0.044
0.659

4,454
4,454
0.045
0.044
0.659
0.659
+
0.761***
0.638**
MAJORFINDING + Interaction
(2.98)
(2.30)
Models are estimated using logistic regression with standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by
client (Petersen 2009). ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Significance is
based on one (two) tailed p-values when a prediction is (not) made.
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TABLE 8: Multivariate Analyses of Inter-Temporal Effect of Inspection Findings
VARIABLES
MAJORFINDING

+

MAJORFINDING x NTHROUND

?

ΔPERCENTFINDING

?

NTHROUND

?

PARTNERS

?

CLIENTS

?

AUDITDELAY

?

GCO

+

AUDITFEES

?

GROWTH

+

SIZE

?

LEVERAGE

?

Intercept

?

Fixed Effects
Observations
Pseudo R2
Area Under ROC Curve

(1)
DISMISS

(2)
DISMISS

0.397***
(3.694)

0.467***
(3.297)
-0.162
(-0.776)

(4)
DISMISS

0.075
(0.388)
-0.058
(-0.597)
0.001
(0.050)
0.005***
(2.780)
0.002**
(1.962)
-0.196
(-1.392)
0.090
(1.335)
0.183***
(2.964)
-0.142***
(-5.581)
-0.155
(-0.946)
-1.337**
(-2.009)

-0.002
(-0.020)
0.001
(0.077)
0.005***
(2.845)
0.002*
(1.925)
-0.193
(-1.375)
0.087
(1.284)
0.183***
(2.968)
-0.142***
(-5.581)
-0.155
(-0.941)
-1.340**
(-2.015)

-0.004
(-0.156)
0.005**
(2.056)
0.001
(0.777)
-0.065
(-0.303)
0.047
(0.467)
0.164*
(1.705)
-0.123***
(-3.168)
0.017
(0.072)
-1.378
(-1.448)

Industry

Industry

Industry

4,454
0.041
0.652

4,454
2,187
0.042
0.036
0.652
0.637
?
0.305*
MAJORFINDING + Interaction
(1.92)
Models are estimated using logistic regression with standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered by client (Petersen 2009). ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively. Significance is based on one (two) tailed p-values when a prediction is (not) made.
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TABLE 9: Analyses of Contracted Auditors after Auditor Dismissals
Full Sample

All Audits Inspected Sample

One Client Sample

Total

No/Minority
Findings

Majority
Findings

Total

No
Findings

Findings

Total

No
Findings

Findings

n = 4,454

n = 3,266

n = 1,188

n = 350

n = 271

n = 79

n = 143

n = 94

n = 49

Total Client Dismissals Following Inspections

525

331

194

41

28

13

18

8

10

Clients Engaging Annually Inspected (Big N
or Second Tier) Auditors

112
21%

84
25%

28
14%

10
24%

8
29%

2
15%

4
22%

3
38%

1
10%

Clients Engaging Larger Non-Annually
Inspected Auditors

194
37%

103
31%

91
47%

25
61%

16
57%

9
69%

13
72%

5
63%

8
80%

Clients Engaging Smaller (or Equal Sized)
Non-Annually Inspected Auditors

219
42%

144
44%

75
39%

6
15%

4
14%

2
15%

1
6%

0
0%

1
10%
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APPENDIX B: Variable Definitions
Variable
AUDITDELAY

Variable Definition
Number of days between the fiscal year end and the signature date of the audit
report at time t. (Audit Analytics)
AUDITFEES
Natural log of total audit fees at time t. (Audit Analytics)
CLIENTS
The number of audits subject to inspection by the PCAOB. An audit is defined as
subject to inspection if the audit opinion signature date occurs within 18 months
of the PCAOB’s inspection procedures. If a client has two audits completed
during this window, only the most recent audit is included in the calculation.
(Audit Analytics)
DISMISS
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client announced a dismissal of the inspected
auditor during the 2 year window following the beginning of inspection
procedures, 0 otherwise. (Audit Analytics)
FIN-UTIL
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client is a financial or utility company. Based
on industry classifications 8 and 11 using the Fama-French 12 industry taxonomy
(SIC codes 4900-4949 and 6000-6999). (Audit Analytics)
FINDING
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client’s auditor received a deficient PCAOB
inspection report, 0 otherwise. (PCAOB Reports)
GROWTH
Change in client total assets from t-1 to t scaled by total assets at t-1. Maximum
value winsorized at 2. (Audit Analytics and Compustat)
GCO
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client receives a going-concern report at time t,
0 otherwise. (Audit Analytics)
PERCENTINSPECTED
Number of issuer audits selected for inspection by the PCAOB scaled by the
number of clients in the auditor’s portfolio. (Audit Analytics and PCAOB
Reports)
INSPECTIONTOREPORT
Number of days between the first date of inspection and the release of the
inspection report. (PCAOB Reports)
LEVERAGE
Total debt at time t scaled by total assets at time t. Maximum value winsorized at
1. (Audit Analytics and Compustat)
NTHROUND
Indicator variable equal to 1 if for second or third round inspections, 0 otherwise.
(Audit Analytics)
MAJORFINDING
Indicator variable equal to 1 if more than half of the auditor’s inspected clients
were found to be deficient, 0 otherwise. (PCAOB Reports)
PARTNERS
The number of the firm’s partners scaled by number of the firm’s clients.
(PCAOB Reports and Audit Analytics)
PERCENTFINDING
The number of inspected audits that included PCAOB findings scaled by the total
number of audits selected for inspection. (PCAOB Reports)
RELATIVESIZE
Total client assets at time t scaled by total assets under audit for the client’s
auditor. (Audit Analytics and Compustat)
RESIGN
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client announced an auditor resignation by the
inspected auditor during the 2 year window following the beginning of inspection
procedures, 0 otherwise. (Audit Analytics)
SIZE
Natural log of total assets at time t. (Audit Analytics and Compustat)
Variables are based on data hand collected from PCAOB inspection reports or downloaded from Audit Analytics
and Compustat databases.
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